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I. Introduction
In the past, management scientists have mainly focused their attention
on the design of decision systems aimed at the solution of programmable
and recurring problems. Such areas as inventory control and refinery
scheduling can now be managed almost automatically by computer driven
mathematical models. Although such models may require extensive as
well as complicated mathematical manipulations, yet in their normal
use they are rather simple in that the fundamental relationships en-
compassed by these models are well prescribed. Martin Starr (Starr 1966)
refers to problem situations which can be depicted by such deterministic
1
planning and control models as "fully-constrained," because their
associated environments, although these may be evolving, they are con-
sidered to be perfectly predictable and all sequences of events are
known with certainty.
Next in terms of complication come planning models which are
probabilistic in nature either in their inputs (both data and assumptions),
or in the fundamental mathematical relationships among the variables in-
2
corporated into these models. These planning models which one may
classify as partially constrained (Starr 1966), lead to tentative con-
sequences requiring the value judgment of the decision maker before a
'We will use Starr's, 8, terminology for classification of planning models.
2
As the reader may have already observed, we are classifying these models
on the basis of the structure chosen by the decision maker in his effort to
choose a course of action and not on the basis of how these decision situa-
tions could have been structured. Obviously fully constrained models could
be set up as probabilistic models. With the exception of pointing this out
we shall not delve into the question of the factors affecting choice of
models, nor in the evaluation of the degree of comprehensiveness of such.
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choice is made. Finally, in extreme cases, planning problems may be de-
picted by threshold-constrained systems (Starr, 8) in which the sequence
of events is speculative, the environment must be forecasted, and some
potential outcomes may be catastrophic.
The problem used in our experiments was of the "partially constrained"
type. We wanted to find out how executives could deal with capital invest-
ment and competitive pricing decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
3
Many writers have pointed out the value of formal planning and also
stressed the necessity of using structured situations as a stepping stone
to higher level (unstructured) planning. Of course this is easier said
than done, and the average manager partly because of necessity but mainly
for escape finds himself spending proportionately much more time on
operational than on planning problems. This relative aversion toward
planning is due both to psychological as well as methodological reasons.
No doubt planning enforces self discipline, requires persistent effort,
provides standards which can be potentially used by superiors for control
and accountability, exposes errors and as such decreases privacy, enforces
integration and cooperation across organizational functions and activities,
with all their human-behavior consequences; and finally demands a resolution
of the inherent conflict between the specific plan as a secure basis for
implementing action and the plan as a temporary mechanism for measuring
deviations, learning from experience and then updating the underlying
4
planning model.
Among others, see Ackoff, R. L., 1, Ansoff, H. I., 2, Starr, M. K., 8,
and Zannetos, Z. S., 10.
4 What we are saying here is that "security" and shielding by the plan
is only temporary and the manager cannot survive with either chaos or
complete regimentation.
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Zannetos (10 p. 13) has identified three reasons why planning
problems are more difficult than operational problems. They are:
1. Absence of structure
2. Absence of many factual elements
3. Presence of uncontrolled environmental conditions
Realizing the complexity of planning problems and the difficulties
associated with designing useful computerized decision systems to aid
the decision maker in solving such problems, we embarked upon a research
project which called for the design, implementation and experimental
use of a computerized planning model. The risk analysis technique (Hertz, 4) /
was chosen as the basis of the model because it incorporated (1) a facility
for structuring problems, (2) a methodology for utilizing subjective esti-
mates of elements for which no factual information exists and (3) a tech-
nique for introducing risk and uncertainty through the use of subjective
probability distributions. While the risk analysis technique does not
eliminate the three major reasons why planning problems are difficult, it
does recognize them and operates on them, and thus mitigates this onerous
managerial task.
It was decided from the outset to implement the risk analysis model
on an interactive graphical display computer terminal. This decision was
made for the following reasons:
1) Interaction was necessary since the system operates on
subjective inputs provided by the user.
2) Since planning decisions are partly based on value judgments
and subjective inputs, the user must have the capability to
ask "what if" type of questions and receive answers in real
time. In this respect we distinguish between two classes of
situations. If the "what if" question involves changing the
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values of some inputs but does not involve changing basic
underlying assumptions, it is defined as sensitivity testing.
If it involves changing most, or all, of the values of the
inputs and also changing the basic underlying assumptions,
then it is defined as a new alternative. These two uses of
the system will be discussed in more detail later.
3) Since the risk analysis techniques utilizes probability distri-
butions as inputs and outputs, it was felt that graphical
representation of the distributions would be more meaningful
and useful than would tabular or parametric representation.
The end product of the systems development effort was a software package
called the Interactive Risk Analysis Model (IGRAM) System which is available
5
on the Compatible Time Shared System (CTSS) at MIT's Computation Center. 
After the IGRAM System was developed during the early part of 1970,
two controlled experiments were conducted which attempted to measure the
impact the IGRAM System had on a decision-making process. The next portion
of this paper is devoted to a discussion of those experiments.
II. The Experiments
1) Introduction
A review of the available literature on planning reveals that it
mostly centers around the need for planning models and to a much lesser 
extent on the implementation of models. There is, however, a dirth of
literature on the observed impact these models have had on the decision
making process. In an effort to fill this deficiency in the literature,
5.
For a detailed discussion of the design and implementation of the IGRAM
System, the reader is referred to Beville, J., et.al., 3.
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it was decided that controlled experiments should be conducted using the
IGRAM System. Our objective was to gather data from experiments which
could be used in analyzing the impact of the system on decision making
(both the results and the process) and also in gaining insights for the
design of future man-machine systems.
2) The Experimental Design
Two sets of subjects were available (business executives), so
the experiment was replicated twice. The experimental design was com-
pletely randomized with two treatments, the latter being: (a) solving
a complex pricing problem using manual solution techniques and (b) solving
the same problem with the aid of the IGRAM System. In each replication
of the experiment the subjects were assigned to two-man teams at random.
Members of the odd numbered teams solved the problem with manual methods
first and then solved it with the aid of the computerized IGRAM System.
Members of the even numbered teams solved the problem with the aid of
the IGRAM System first and then solved it with manual methods. This
ordering scheme was intended to neutralize the learning effect of
having to solve the problem twice. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence
of steps taken by the teams during the conduct of the experiment. Copies
of the referenced questionnaires are contained in Appendix A.
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Figure 1
Experimental Procedure
Order of Events
All
Odd Numbered Teams Teams Even Numbered Teams
Answer Questionnaire
#1.
Receive Copy of Case
Receive Hertz* Article
Solve Case Manually
Answer Questionnaire #2
Receive Copies of IGRAM
Users' Manual
Briefing on and Demonstration
of IGRAM System.
Solve problem with IGRAM
System
Answer Questionnaire #3 Answer Questionnaire #4
Solve Case Manually
Answer Questionnaire #5
Class Discussion of
Problem and IGRAM
System
See Hertz, D. B.,See Hertz, D. B., (4).
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III. The Subjects
a) Senior Executives
The participants in the first replication of the experiment
were twenty businessmen holding high level positions within their
organizations and who had been attending the Spring 1970 session of
the Senior Executive Program, at the Sloan School of Management at
M.I.T.. The program is nine weeks long and is designed to update the
senior executives' knowledge of modern management techniques and expose
the participants to present research and futuretrends in the field of
management. The executives were in their seventh week of the nine week
program when the experiment started. During the program, the executives
were housed in Endicott House, a suburban mansion belonging to M.I.T..
With this arrangement, the participants had unlimited opportunities
for exchanging ideas. On the whole, the Senior Executives were in-
terested in the experiment and enthusiastic about their participation,
which incidentally was voluntary.
b) The Greater Boston Executives
The participants in the second replication of the experiment
were twenty-five businessmen from the Greater Boston area who had been
selected by their firms to participate in the Spring 1970 session of the
Greater Boston Executive Program. The program is conducted by the Sloan
School of Management and lasts fifteen weeks. The participants attend
classes only during each Friday of the fifteen weeks, and perform their
regular duties at their firms during the other four days of the work
week. The four class periods each Friday are designed to update the
executives' knowledge in the areas of economics, managerial planning,
information and controls, labor economics and social responsibility.
I
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This program is not as extensive in its coverage as the Senior Executive Program.
Furthermore, these executives generally hold positions of lesser responsi-
bility than do the Senior Executives, are not as mature managerially, are
younger in age and comparatively less well educated than the Senior
Executives. The Greater Boston Executives were in their sixth week of
the program when the experiment started.
Unlike the Senior Executives (SE), the Greater Boston Executives (GBE)
lived at home during the program. Practically the only contact they had
with each other was during the Friday classes and during activities
associated with the experiment.
IV. Expected Impacts
If we use for reference the phases of the decision making process as
6postulated by Simon6 --intelligence, design, and choice--the IGRAM System
was expected to affect only "design" and "choice," the intelligence, i.e.,
problem definition, having been taken care of by the material distributed
to the subjects. In particular we were hoping that the system would help
the user in the "design" phase by:
(1) Facilitating the structuring of the alternative courses
of action
(2) Bringing to bear on the problem the decision-maker's subjec-
tive estimates of the values of uncertain variables.
(3) Performing the complex computations required to accomplish
(2) above.
(4) Facilitating sensitivity testing.
6See Simon, H. A., 7~. Other writers on the subject (especially Ackoff 1,
Starr 8, and Zannetos 10) tend to look at these phases as aspects of the
planning process.
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As for "choice" activity, the system was not so much intended to
make the choice, but hopefully aid the decision-maker in evaluating more
effectively the alternatives generated by:
(1) Providing more information than do manual methods.
The system accomplishes this mainly by providing a graph
of the probabilistic distribution of the net present
values rather than just the expected value of such which
is normally provided by manual methods.
(2) Displaying information in a format which is easy to under-
stand. The system for example provides graphs rather than
tables of values or mathematical descriptions of the various
probability curves.
(3) Allowing the decision-maker to comprehend the impact which
his subjective estimates of risk and uncertainty have on
computed expected outcomes.
(4) Making it easy for the subjects to change the values of the
planning and decision variables and thus easily evaluate
and choose among alternatives.
V. Hypotheses to be Tested
The hypotheses which we wanted to test were mainly as follows:
1) The subjects will tend to examine more alternative courses of
action when using the computer than they will when solving the case manually.
7.
Morton's work (Morton, M.S.S. 5) tends to support this hypothesis which
seems to be rather widely accepted.
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2) The subjects will tend to have more confidence in their computer-
aided decision than in their manual decision. This proposition appears
a priori to be reasonable for the following reasons:
(a) The system allows the subjects to bring to bear all
of their knowledge--objective, subjective and risk
estimates--on the evaluation of.the future consequences
of each alternative course of action. Thus the results
will tend to appear to them as more dependable and
"scientific."
(b) The system gives the subjects better knowledge of the
structure of the problem, and through sensitivity testing,
an idea of the relative impact exerted by the key variables
on expected outcomes. They will feel therefore that they
have a firmer grasp of the problem and that the computer-
aided decision rests on a firmer foundation.
(c) The system carries out the calculations and gives the
decision-maker additional quantitative information concerning
the degree of risk and uncertainty associated with a proposed
course of action. The additional information in this case
consists of the graphs of the various terminal probability
distributions, which is normally not available under manual
methods.
(d) The system displays probabilistic information in formats,
X · ~namely graphs, which are easier to understand than alternative
formats, such as tables or listings of distribution parameters.
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(e) Psychologically the subjects may feel insecure and tend
to accept the results of manipulations they do not very
well understand. Furthermore, the feeling that systems
are designed by "experts" who undoubtedly store in the
computer the best decision-making models known to them
tends to encourage too much faith in the results of such
models.
3) The decisions made with the aid of the computer, that is, the
courses of action recommended, will differ from these suggested by manual
methods. This is felt to be true because:
(a) The system provides the subjects with more information
concerning risk and uncertainty than they will be able to
8generate by using manual methods.
(b) When using the computerized system, the subjects will tend
to rank the risk and uncertainty inherent in an alternative
-higher as a factor influencing their decision than they will
when using manual methods. This appears logical since
measures of risk even in their simplest form, e.g., variance,
and general shape of the distribution of net present values,
will be nearly impossible for the subjects to generate by
using manual methods. They, therefore, will not tend to
appreciate the significance of risk in decision making. If
this hypothesis is proven then certain aspects of the
educational value of the computerized system are proven also.
The underlying assumption here is that the executives are able to comprehend
and process this information. Schroder, H. M., et.al., 6, have found that
beyond a certain point of environmental complexity people tend to process less
information. In our case the structure provided by the system reduces the
complexity so we do not believe that we will be reaching beyond the maximum
information processing point.
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VI. Measurement Instruments
Three types of instruments were used to collect data during the
experiment. They were:
1) A set of five questionnaires.
2) Written solutions to the case which were handed in by the teams,
one for manual solution and one for the computer-aided solution.
3) An informal debriefing of each set of subjects in order to
obtain their reactions to the IGRAM System in particular and to
the use of planning models in general. In addition, the research
assistants who observed the subjects during their computer terminal
sessions gathered valuable informal data.
VII. The Problem
The problem which each subject had to solve twice and which was
implemented on the IGRAM System was a capital investment case study. Two
basic alternative courses of action were open -- 1) discontinue producing
a textile product which was a part of the firm's full line of textiles,
sell off the associated equipment and inventory, and collect the associated
accounts receivable;, or 2) continue producing the product for the next
four years (the equipment would be worn out at that time) and, given that
decision, further decide upon the best pricing strategy to follow.
The problem was implemented on the IGRAM System in the form of a
problem tree, as shown in Figure 2. The "Stay in Business" alternatives
1 and 2 represent two different pricing strategies over the four year time
horizon. Such elements as Industry Volume and Market Share would be adjusted
in each case to correspond with the particular pricing strategy chosen. For
instance, a high pricing strategy might call for a smaller industry volume
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and a smaller market share than would a low pricing strategy. All inputs
to the elements on the end points of the tree are in the form of cumulative
9
subjective probability distributions.
VIII. Analysis of the Experimental Data
We will now analyze some of the data which were collected on the
experiments and compare the odd numbered teams to the even numbered teams
within each replication of the experiment. In addition, comparisons will
be made between the results generated by each of the replications.
As the reader may recall, the primary difference between the odd
numbered and even numbered teams, within each replication, was that the
odd numbered teams solved the problem manually before solving it with the
aid of the IGRAM System, while the even numbered teams first solved it
with the aid of the computer system. The main difference between the two
replications of the experiment was the difference in the managerial experience
and education of the two sets of subjects. As we have already stated,
in general the Senior Executives (SE) had more management and general
education than did the Greater Boston Executives (GBE). With these
differences in mind, let us now examine the experimental data.
1. The Decision Made
The case that we used for the experiments was structured so that the
net expected values of the alternatives were very close together. This was
done in order to elicit the value judgments of the subjects, their utility
9For a more complete description of the IGRAM System, the reader is
referred to Beville, J., et.al., 3.
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regarding risk and uncertainty and any other intangible elements which
might creep into their decision-making process. Given the above experi-
mental bias, the results of Table 1, which represent the number of changes
in decisions after the experiments, tend to substantiate our hypothesis that
decision are affected by the computer. A little further we will look into
the reasons behind most of these switches, but right now let us look at the
data of Table 1. In the context of the question asked, the decisions of
a subject were defined as "switched" if one recommended that the company
discontinue making the product, while the other decision recommended con-
tinuation of operations.
Of the sixteen Senior Executives who used the system and completed
the experiments, only two reported a switch in their decision.1 0 In sharp
contrast nine out of twenty one Greater Boston Executives switched. This
may lead us to hypothesize that the Senior Executives are possibly more
conservative than the relatively younger Greater Boston Executives, or that
the latter were not as mature and thorough in their original analysis and
therefore learned relatively more after the first solution than did the
Senior Executives. In our estimation, it is mainly the relative immaturity
of the Greater Boston Executives in making high-level decisions which is
manifested in the results and this is supported by evidence presented in
Tables 3 and 4.
If we were to assume that all the subjects belong to the same universe
11
then we would expect to find approximately five Senior Executives switching
instead of two and six Greater Boston Executives instead of nine. Also, if
the'"treatments" were neutral we would expect to find about five switches
lThere were twenty Senior Executives in the program but only sixteen volunteered
for the experiment. The respective figures for the Greater Boston Executive
program were 25 .participants and 21 volunteers.
1 1The figures are rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table 1
Differences Between Computer-Aided
and Manual Decisions
Senior Executives
Odd Teams
Switches
No change
Total
2
7
9
Even Teams
0
7
7
Greater Boston Executives
Switches
No change
Total
Grand Total
5
4
9
18
4
8
12
19
Note: Odd Teams solved the case first manually and then used the
system while the Even Teams did the opposite.
Total
2
14
16
9
12
21
37
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occurring among the odd teams and six among the even teams instead of
seven versus four respectively.
While we do not wish to strain the limited amount of data we have
for statistical significance, it is evident to us that the data suggest
that there exist differences between the Senior Executives and the Greater
Boston Executives and also between the odd and the even teams.
In Table 2 we present the qualitative decision made by those who
switched. The data reveal that the six of the ten subjects, for whom
complete information exists, chose to continue the production of the
product when they used the system and chose to discontinue its production
when they solved the problem with manual methods. Five of these six
subjects belonged to the odd-numbered teams which solved the case manually
at first and then used the computerized system.
In order to ascertain the reasons behind the switches we asked the
subjects to tell us which decision they preferred and to qualify the change
of decision. Out of eleven, ten provided information and indicated that
all ten would stick to their computer-aided decision. The reasons behind
the "switches" are listed in Table 3.
At first glance there appears to be a discrepancy between some of the
evidence contained in Tables 2, 3 and the "absolute" faith in the computerized
decision shown by those who switched. Especially in view of the four
switches among the even-numbered team members who, as the reader may remember,
solved the probelm manually before using the computer. What the subjects are
actually saying is that the data they developed manually dictated a decision
opposite to the one they arrived at with the aid of the system. However, if
they had to choose between the two different solutions, they would stick to
their computer-aided decision.
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Table 2
Differences Between Manual
Decisions for those
Changed their
and Computer-aided
subjects who
Decisions
Number Reporting
Senior Executives
Odd Numbered Team Members
2
Greater Boston Executives
Odd Numbered Team Members 4
1
Manual
Discontinue
Manual
Discontinue
Continue
Computer-aided
Continue
Computer-aided
Continue
Discontinue
Even Numbered Team Members
1
2
1
Computer-aided Manual
Discontinue Continue
Continue Discontinue
No data available
Decisions
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Table 3
Reasons for Switching Decisions and Occurrences
Reasons -Provided
Senior Executives
The subject made errors in
manual solution
The assumptions were not exactly
the same
Greater Boston Executives
The subject did not consider the
same costs for every input re-
quired in both solutions
The computer provided more data
The subject made errors in manual
solution
No reason given
Odd Team
I
1
2
3
1
21
Even Team
1
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The results of Table 3 further indicate that the computer system forced
two of the odd numbered team members within the Greater Boston Executives
to use only the relevant variable costs in the analysis of the alternatives.
These subjects had used some fixed costs in their previous manual solutions,
but subsequently the computer guided them to the relevant differential
costs. In other words the computerized system imposed a methodological
discipline. Three even-numbered team members did, however, indicate that
their computer-aided decisions were based on more data than were their
manual decisions. In this respect we must assume that the additional data
were the graphs of the distributions of net present values since that was
the only new information which was generated by the system. Unless of
course the availability of easy computational power was mislabeled as
"more data."
We must admit that we expected more dramatic differences between the
two modes of decision making. Possibly, the limited range of differences
between the manual and computer-aided decisions can be explained in part
by the abstraction of realism in the experiment. A decision maker in
real-life situation would no doubt possess a great deal more intuition
and judgment than did the experimental subjects, and he might therefore be
able to specify better probability distributions than those devised by the
subjects. Also, as already explained, the expected values of the two major
alternatives posed in the problem were intended to be so close together that
any decision would have to be made on the basis of the differences in the
shapes of the net present value distributions, "intangibles" and qualitative
assumptions. When proper manual methods were used, the expected net present
values for the two major alternatives--continue or discontinue--were almost
identical. However, when the subjects used the system they tended to make
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optimistic sales projections which tipped the scales in favor of continuing
production of the item. This fact made it easy for the subjects to make
their computer-aided decision without having to differentiate between the
alternatives on the basis of the shape of their corresponding distributions
of net present values. Both the transcript of the subjects' use of the
computerized systems as well as the data of Tables tends to substantiate
this explanation. As can be seen in Table 2 of the seven odd-numbered team
12
members 1 who switched, only one decided to discontinue with the other six
deciding to stay with the product.
2. The Decision Making Process
(a) The hypotheses that subjects would rank risk higher as an influence
on their computer-aided decision than on their manual decision received
mixed support. The Senior Executives responses supported the hypothesis
while the Greater Boston Executives responses did not support it. In addition
to a possibility that this hypothesis is not valid there may be two other
explanations of the reaction of the Greater Boston Executives: (i) Being
less mature, as managers these subjects may not have appreciated the
importance of risk in decision making and (ii) the question attempted to
make a ranking distinction between risk, short-term, and long-term profit-
ability as criteria for managerial choice. It is quite probable that these
subjects were unable to make such fine distinction especially since risk is
not completely independent from short and long term profitability.
12
The reader is reminded that the odd-numbered teams attacked the problem
manually at first and then worked with the system.
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Table 4
Number of Alternative Courses of Action Examined
SE
Computer-aided Manual
Odd
m=5.561
v=2.25
n= 9
Even
m=3.43
v=0.858
n= 7
Odd
m=5.00
v=6.293
n = 8
GBE
Computer-aided
Odd
mi=3.67
v=6.007
n= 9
Even
m=2.666
v=0.4277
n= 12
Odd
m=3.70
v=5.349
n=9
Even
m=2.862
v=0.83
n= 7
Manual 
Even
m=2.508
v=0.4559
n = 12
Where numean of the sample; v=variance of the sample; and n=sample size
T-test on difference means is significant at 0.1% level.
T-test on difference between means is significant at 5% level.
F-test on ratio of variances is significant at 2.5% level.
T-test on the differences between the means is significant at the 0.1% level.
F-test on the ratio of the variances is significant at the 1% level.
Difference is significant at the 10% level.
Ratio of variances is significant at the 1% level.
Difference is significant at the 5% level.
Both
Odd
m=5.344
v=4.005
n = 17
Even
m=3.144
v=0.5085
n = 14
Both
Odd
m=3.681 0
v=5.341 1
n = 18
Even
m=2.5810 
v=O0.4171 1
n = 24
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6+8.
7+9+11.
10.
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(b) The results in both replications only weakly supported the
hypothesis that decision makers would examine more alternative courses
of action when using the system than when using manual methods. Table 4
contains the results of the experiments.
As can be seen in Table 4, the only case where a set of teams re-
ported examining fewer alternatives when using the computer system than
when using manual methods (3.67 versus 3.70) was the odd-numbered GBE teams.
All other teams reported an increase although in no case the mean
differences were statistically significant. The startling result revealed
by these data is that the odd-numbered team members in every instance, 
examined significantly more alternatives than did the even-numbered team
members. In the case of the Senior Executives, the odd-numbered teams
examined 5.56 computer-aided alternatives versus 5.00 manual alternatives
while the even-numbered teams examined 3.43 and 2.86 alternatives respectively.
The overall average number of alternatives examined was 5.34 for the odd-
numbered teams versus 3.14 for the even-numbered. These data are
statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Similar results are revealed
by the Greater Boston Executives experiments although not as strongly.
Another startling observation is the difference in the variances between the
odd and the even-numbered teams, which differences are again statistically
significant at the 0.1% level. The fact that the odd-numbered teams solved
the problem manually first, seems to have had an important influence upon
their decision on how many alternatives to examine.
A possible explanation of the results of Table 4, is that the method
initially used by a decision-maker sets the style he will use in subsequent
decision making including the general number of alternatives he will examine
before arriving at a decision. When the odd-numbered teams first approached
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the problem manually, they were possibly not very confident in their manual
methods of considering risk and uncertainty. Therefore, they examined
many different alternative courses of action before they made their final
decisions. The even-numbered teams, however, first solved the case with
the aid of the computerized system. They possibly had a high degree of
confidence in the way the computer system handled risk, so they did not feel
the need to examine many alternatives. The high level of confidence of the
even numbered teams, therefore, may have led them to a strange sense of
security which resulted in their examining fewer alternatives, on average,
than did the odd-numbered teams. We presented the results to the participants
without expressing our views as to the cause and they provided the same
explanation.
Hence, the method first used by the decision-maker sets the style he
will use in subsequent decision-making. Given their respective styles, as
reflected by the number of alternatives they considered, three of the four
groups did, however, examine more alternatives when they used the system
than when they used manual methods. We must stress again, however, that for
each group, the mean differences between the number of alternatives examined
(computer-aided versus manual) were not statistically significant, contrary
to widely held notions.
(c) In accordance with out previously stated hypothesis, the subjects
in both replications reported that they had more confidence in their computer-
aided decision than they had in their manual decision. This was reported
in spite of the fact that only 11 of 37 subjects changed their decisions.1 3
13As we have already stressed, the subjects may have changed decisions or
not simply on the basis of the output data of the method used. However, even
those who switched decisions after they attacked the case manually still had
more confidence in the computer-aided decision.
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So, even in the cases where the manual and the computer-aided decisions were
the same, (in fact even in the case where the subsequent manual method
dictated a switch), the subjects had more confidence in their computer-
aided decision. The causes for the higher degree of confidence in the
computer-aided decisions were traced to:
(1) The subjects confidence in the "risk analysis method" of
handling uncertainty.
(2) The additional information the system provided in the form
of graphs of the distributions of net present values.
(3) The structure imposed on the problem by the system.
(4) The ease with which the subjects understood the graphical
information.
(5) The subjects ability to perform sensitivity tests, that is,
ask "what if" questions of the system.
(6) The "fact that the system was designed by experts who must have
for sure incorporated in it the latest management science
techniques."
The results under (b) and (c) above may also indicate another phenomenon
14
which Schroder has observed in his experiments . He found that after a
certain degree of complexity in the environment the subjects tend to process
less information and yet feel more confident in their decision. So it could
be that trying fewer alternatives, as did the even-numbered teams, was a
manifestation of an inability to cope with the complexity of the computerized
case which resulted in a bias toward a lower level of information processing.
These are among some challenging hypotheses which we intend to explore in
the future.
14
Related to one. of the authors.
2
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IX. Implications of Planning Models for Management
Based on the results of the experimental use of the IGRAM System,
we feel that planning models, such as the IGRAM System, hold an exciting
promise for management in the future. The following are some of the uses
which we foresee:
1) As a central tool. The IGRAM System requires the user to input
his subjective estimates of future states of nature, and decisions are made
based on the information generated from those estimates. All of this
information can be stored in machine readable form and can be quickly
accessed by the user. It seems natural that managers will want to review
the progress of projects which were approved with the aid of the IGRAM System
or one similar to it. These reviews could be made very easily by examining
the original assumptions and estimates and comparing them with later
appraisals of the situation. Current data could be periodically introduced
into the system to facilitate such reviews. Quick, convenient, real-time,
computer-aided reviews would help the decision-maker detect problems--
assumptions which are not coming true or critical estimates which are off
the mark--and use the Monte Carlo simulation technique to project the con-
sequences of these problems and evaluate alternative solutions to the problem.
As the managers use the system to. help control the project, they would also
learn more and more about the nature of the variables which are key to the
project, and eventually develop a diagnostic system rather than do post mortems.
2) As an educational tool. A system, such as IGRAM, could be used
to teach new managers the procedures used in making decisions in the past--
the elements considered the assumptions and estimate made--and the process
through which they should progress in making future decisions. The use of
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the system in thismanner will undoubtedly reveal the weaknesses of past
decisions as well as their strength. The use of such a system appears to be
a much more efficient method of training managers than any method in use today.
3) To improve consistency in decision making. The structure and
discipline imposed on problem solving should produce more consistent and
efficient decision making. Within a firm, it would be possible to have
the specialists in making certain types of decisions develop their own models,
which models in turn can be used by other managers within the firm whenever
they are faced with one of those types of decisions. Another advantage
such a system would provide is that of constituting a permanent memory.
Experience would not be lost when a "good" manager leaves the firm. His
decision-making technique would be left behind for others to study and learn.
Also the "weeding out" of obsolete methods, through automatic updating of planning
models, would eliminate a lot of the inefficiencies we find in practice today.
4) To improve communications. With a system such as IGRAM, qualified
people can specify the structure of the problem and then experts from the
various relevant areas can enter their estimates of the variables related
to their area of expertise. Methods could even be devised to reconcile the
differences between the "expert opinions" of several experts on a single
variable in those cases where there is disagreement.
5) A tool for consensus decision-making. If we go a step beyond the
resolution of differences between expert opinions we can see how such a system
could facilitate the resolution of differences between recommended courses
of action in cases where there are many decision makers. Since all inputs
to the system must be explicit, any differences of opinion may be traced
to individual inputs, to the system, or to individually held values. In
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either case, the use of the system can help to isolate the cause of the
disagreement and hopefully aid in its resolution. We see interactive
systems with global models as means of increasing communication and under-
standing of complex interrelationships.
Obviously, the surface of the field of planning model development
and use has only been scratched. Much is yet to be discovered and validated.
The need is for more detailed, documented experimental work using prototype
models. The sooner we discover the secrets of planning models, the sooner
managers will be able to harvest the fruits of their use.
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